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In this paper we study and quantify the e¤ects of a disinationary policy
on output and welfare. Our focus is the policy question of the optimal
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model with sticky prices, time varying velocity and imperfect credibility.
The nonlinear solution method reveals that early output losses may be more
pronounced and more prolonged than previously suggested in the literature,
and there may be insu¢ cient compensation from a subsequent higher steady
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1. Introduction
There is a general consensus in the economics profession that high rates
of ination have signicant adverse consequences and that these adverse
consequences justify the sacrices in employment and output that are generally
needed to reduce ination. Furthermore, it is now well established that the
appropriate policy response to a high ination is to disinate immediately (see,
for example, Ireland (1997)). However, there is no corresponding widespread
agreement about the appropriate policy response to a low ination, despite the
fact that estimating potential gains in welfare from reducing ination has been
addressed in a long line of research stemming from the classic contributions
of Bailey (1956) and Friedman (1969). This research embraces a number of
modelling set ups ranging across partial equilibrium analyses, in which the
preferred functional form of the demand for money function is central (see, for
example, Chada et al (1998), Lucas (2000), Ireland (2009), Serletis and Yavari
(2004)  through developments giving explicit consideration to tax distortions
(Cooley and Hansen (1991), Feldstein (1997))  to general equilibrium set ups
such as Dotsey and Ireland (1996), Abel (1997) and Dibooglu and Kenc (2009).
Although much of this literature tends to ndmoderate estimates of the welfare
cost of ination, the policy questions of whether and how policy makers should
respond to even a small ination persist. This is partly because ination is deeply
unpopular with the general public (see, for example, Shiller (1997)) and this
generates some political imperative to do something about it: but also, because
the magnitude of the welfare e¤ects of even small inations may be economically
non-trivial.
In this paper, we explore the dynamic impact of disinating from low values of
ination using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model which incorporates
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time-varying velocity and allows for imperfect credibility. More precisely, we study
the e¤ects of a disinationary monetary policy when policy makers are committed
to price stability in the strict sense of achieving and maintaining a constant price
level. The analysis takes place in a New Keynesian environment where the supply-
side of the economy is characterised by monopolistically competitive rms, and
where there is rigidity in the setting of prices. The model builds on Ireland
(1997), endogenising time-varying velocity in that framework (as in Evans and
Nicolae, 2009) and allows for the possibility that policy makers may not enjoy
complete credibility (as in Nicolae and Nolan, 2006)1. We employ a non-linear
solution method which allows us to explore output responses to disinationary
monetary policies extending the analysis beyond the early output loss to explicit
consideration of the changing steady state.
Within this set-up we explore issues of rst order policy importance. Central
is Irelands clear policy conclusion - that small disinations are best disinated
gradually and the nding that, when time-varying velocity is allowed for, this
conclusion cannot be unconditionally endorsed (see Evans and Nicolae, 2009). In
this paper we explore this issue further. Not only do we explore the output e¤ects
of disnationary policies, we explicitly consider the e¤ects on welfare and also
calculate the optimal speed of disination when velocity is time-varying.
The following section of this paper presents the model and the parameter
values used in the calibration. Section 3 presents benchmark results familiar from
the existing literature showing the output response to immediate and gradual
disinations (from a small ination) when velocity is assumed constant and there
is perfect credibility. Section 4 analyses the output response to gradual disination
1Almeida and Bonomo (2002) and Bonomo and Carvalho (2009) analyse the output cost
of disination under imperfect credibility and endogenous state-dependent and time-dependent
pricing strategies respectively. The learning schemes they adopt involve Bayesian updating. The
model developed in this paper adopts an exogenous, simple learning scheme and embraces both
pricing strategies.
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in the full model (when velocity is time-varying and there is imperfect credibility).
Section 5 discusses the optimal speed of disination, and section 6 concludes the
paper.
2. The Model
The framework employed for this analysis extends the perfect foresight model
developed in (Ireland, 1997), and (Evans and Nicolae, 2009). The component
parts of this model are now familiar in the literature.
2.1. The Representative Agent
Each period, the representative agent makes plans for consumption and
leisure/labour to maximize the expected present discounted utility:
1X
t=0
t

C1 t   1
1     Nt

;  > 0; (1)
which is separable in consumption and labour supply.  2 (0; 1) is a discount
factor,  is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution and  is the disutility of
work. Consumption, Ct; is dened over a continuum of goods
Ct =
Z 1
0
ct(i)
b 1
b di
 b
b 1
b > 0;
where ct(i) is, in equilibrium, the number of units of each good i from rm i that
the representative agent consumes and b is the price elasticity of demand. Labour
supply, Nt; is
Nt =
Z 1
0
nt (i) di;
where nt(i) denotes the quantity of labour supplied by the household to each rm
i, at the nominal wage Wt, during each period.
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Households face an aggregate price level, Pt; given by:
Pt =
Z 1
0
pt(i)
1 bdi
 1
1 b
;
where pt(i) is the nominal price at which rm i must sell output on demand
during time t. Households supply labour to all rms, which, together with the
budget constraint below (equation (2), ensures that the marginal utility of wealth
equalizes across agents.
Each period, the representative household faces a budget constraint of the
following form:Z 1
0
[Qt (i) st 1 (i) + t (i) +Wtnt (i)] di 
Z 1
0
[pt (i) ct (i) +Qt (i) st (i)] di; (2)
where Qt (i) denotes the nominal price of a share in rm i, st(i) denotes the
quantity of shares, t (i) di = Dt(i)st(i), where Dt(i) is the dividend associated
with a unit share, and
R 1
0
pt (i) ct (i) di = PtCt denotes total nominal expenditure
on non-durable consumption. We assume that for t = 0; s 1(i) = 1; for all
i 2 [0; 1]: Also, we assume that each household owns an equal share of all the
rms. The constraint (2) says that, in each period, income (nancial plus labour)
must be less than the value of expenditure (on non-durable consumption plus
nancial investment). The household chooses ct(i); nt(i); st(i) so as to maximize
(1) subject to the constraint (2) and the relevant initial and transversality
conditions. Additionally, its optimal allocation across di¤erentiated goods ct(i)
must satisfy:
ct(i) = Ct

pt(i)
Pt
 b
: (3)
The aggregate equilibrium nominal magnitudes are determined by a quantity-
theory type relation:
MtVt =
Z 1
0
pt (i) ct (i) di = PtCt; (4)
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where the velocity of circulation, Vt is time-varying. It is given by:
Vt = 
C

t e
t ;  2 [0; 1);  2 [0; 1); (5)
where (1  ) is the scale elasticity of money demand and  is the semi-elasticity
with respect to the opportunity cost variable, t = PtPt 1   1; ination. Di¤erent
values of parameters  and  capture di¤erent degrees of time varying velocity
and Irelands case of a constant velocity is nested as a special case (for  = 0 and
 = 0), as in (Evans and Nicolae, 2009). For any non-zero positive values of  or
; velocity is time-varying and endogenous to the model.
The agent solves the maximization problem, yielding the following rst order
conditions:
C t = tPt; (6)
 = tWt; (7)
(from (6) and (7))
Wt = PtC

t : (8)
And for all i
Qt(i) = Dt(i) + (t+1=t)Qt+1(i); (9)
where t is an unknown multiplier associated with the budget constraint (2)2.
2.2. The Corporate Sector
The supply-side of the economy consists of monopolistically competitive rms and
there is price rigidity. A continuum of rms, indexed by i over the unit interval,
each produces a di¤erent, perishable consumption good, indexed by i 2 [0; 1],
where rm i produces good i. The representative household trades shares in each
2For simplicity, 
 is here set equal to unity.
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rm i, which sell at the nominal price Qt(i) at the beginning of time t; and pay a
nominal dividend Dt(i) at the end of time t.
We assume a simple linear production technology yt(i) = lt(i), where yt(i) and
lt(i) are the output of rm i and the labour used to produce it, respectively. Yt
is aggregate output. Equilibrium returns to shareholders at time t for rm i are
given by:
Dt(i) = [pt(i) Wt (i)]

pt (i)
Mt
 b
C
1 b(1 )
t   It(i)Wt(i)k; (10)
where
It(i) =

1; if the rm pays the cost of price adjustment k at moment t;
0; if the rm does not pay the cost k at moment t:
Costly price adjustment is central to this model, in which time-dependent and
state-dependent strategies are both present. Firms are divided into two categories,
such that at time t rms belonging to the rst category can freely change their
prices, p1;t(i), while rms belonging to the second must sell output at the same
price as they set a period before, p2;t(i) = p2;t 1(i); unless they pay the xed cost
k > 0, measured in terms of labour. At time t+ 1, the roles are reversed and the
rst category of rms keeps prices unchanged, p1;t+1(i) = p1;t(i), unless they are
willing to pay the xed cost k; while the second category of rms can freely set
new prices.
Firms are constantly re-evaluating their pricing strategy, weighing the benets
of holding prices xed against the alternative of changing prices and incurring the
xed penalty. At moment t the rms that can freely change price are able to choose
between two strategies, depending on whether the ination rate is moderate or
high. At moderate rates of ination, they are more likely to keep their prices
constant for two periods and hence avoid the cost k (single price strategy). On
the other hand, in the case of a high ination, or in the face of sharp changes in
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the monetary stance, rms are more likely to choose a new price and pay the cost
k (two price strategy). The price-setting decision at time t maximizes the return
to shareholders.
The equilibrium in the model is given by the market clearance conditions for
the three markets present in this model (goods market, labour market and asset
market). Clearance in two markets assures clearance in the third. From the
market clearance conditions for the goods and labour markets we have:
Ct = Yt = Lt:
The clearance condition for the asset market is st 1(i) = 1;8i 2 [0; 1], in each
period.
2.3. The pricing strategies
There are two pricing strategies the rm can follow. Under the single price
strategy, rm i chooses the price pt(i) to maximize the expression:
t(i) = Dt(i) + 

t+1
t

Dt+1(i); (11)
which follows from (9), and implies that prices are set to maximize market value.
Substituting (4) and (8) into (10), and then this into equation (11), yields the
price rm i will use for two consecutive time periods:
pt(i) =
b
b  1e
t
M bt Y
1 b(1 )
t + M
b
t+1Y
1 b(1 )
t+1
M b 1t Y
2 b(1 )  
t + M
b 1
t+1 Y
2 b(1 )  
t+1
:
This equation, familiar from the New Keynesian economics literature, shows
that the optimal price is a function of current and future anticipated demand
and cost conditions; and that, in steady-state, price is a xed mark-up over
marginal costs. As is familiar in models of monopolistic competition, the markup
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is constant and determined by the elasticity of demand (that is, it is tied down via
the preference side of the model): the lower the elasticity, the higher the mark-up.
Under the two price strategy, rm i chooses the price pt(i) to maximize the
expression:
t(i) = Dt(i) (12)
and now the optimizing price is:
pt(i) =
b
b  1e
t
Mt
Y 1  t
:
Again, prices are a mark-up, but now only current period demand and cost
conditions are relevant since only current dividend matters.
2.4. Monetary Policy
The disinationary policy employed in this paper follows the approach adopted by
(Ball 1994), (Ireland 1997) and (Nicolae and Nolan 2006). The monetary policy
is designed to bring money growth to zero over some time horizon. Specically,
at period 0, the authorities make a surprise announcement about the path for the
money supply, fMtgTt=0, such that by time period T ination will be zero. This
announced path for the money supply implies a decrease in the growth rate of the
money supply.
Let
t =
Mt
Mt 1
denote the gross rate at which the money supply increases at time t. We adopt a
disinationary process of the following sort:
t =

t 1   'T 1 (i   ) ; t < T   1
1; t  T ; ' 2 (0; 1) ; (13)
where i is the initial rate of ination from which the disination process starts,
 is the nal (target) ination to be set here at  = 1.
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A horizon of time T = 1 implies immediate disination, while for T > 1 the
policymakers engineer a more gradual path towards price stability. To facilitate
comparison with the existing literature we employ a linear disinationary policy
following (Ireland 1997, Nicolae and Nolan 2006 and Evans and Nicolae 2009),
which we obtain for ' = (1=T )
1
T 1 :
2.5. Imperfect Credibility
In this paper imperfect credibility is modelled in the style of Nicolae and Nolan
(2006) in which credibility is imperfect, but nevertheless improving over time. The
probability mass characterising agentssubjective expectations is shifting through
time onto the central banks announced money supply path,

MAs
	T+J
s=0
; J  0.
It is assumed that agents perceive of two possible outcomes regarding the path
for the money supply: the monetary authoritys announced path for the money
supply and a more inationary path for the money supply. There are two choices
for the more inationary path i) agents perceive the authorities as reverting to the
previous steady state ination rate; and ii) agents fear the government will run
out of steamsuch that at time t (for 0 < t < T ) the growth rate of the money
stock will be equal to the growth rate between t  1 and t.
As it is assumed that the authorities stick to the announced path of disination,
these alternate expectations are:
Et+j 1Mt+j = t+j 1MAt+j 1 + (1  t+j)MAt+j;
Et+j 1Mt+j = t+jt 1MAt+j 1 + (1  t+j)MAt+j;
where fsgT+Js=0 is given by two plausible characterizations of the transition between
imperfect credibility and perfect foresight. These are given by:
t =

( 1) (N2   (t  N)2) 12 + 0; t < N   1
0; t  N (14)
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where N captures the time it takes for agents to believe completely the central
banks announcements (we assumed in this paper N  T ) , 0 is a measure of the
initial level of credibility, and  = N=0. For  = 0 we have what is labeled as
concavelearning3 and  = 1 convexlearning4.
For the purposes of comparison we adopt 0 = 1 which means that agents
start the learning process from total lack of credibility and N = 6 which means
that after three years the agents take the central bank announcment at face value
(implying that agents nally believe completely the announcement when, and only
when, price stability is actually achieved)5. Furthermore, all the analysis in this
paper is conducted assuming concavelearning.
Introducing uncertainty into our framework results in some computational
complexity which requires a more complex nonlinear solution method to solve
this model.
2.6. Model Calibration
This section presents the calibration of the model. Again, to facilitate comparison
with the existing literature, we employ parameter values drawn from the wider
literature. For ease of reference, Table 1 sets out the parameter values used in the
calibration. We allow the newly introduced parameters  and  to take a number
3That is,  plots as a concave function of time on the x y plane, where the x axis measures
time. This captures the intuitive idea that agents may be reluctant to update their priors
initially. However, as time goes by and the central bank sticks to its announced money supply
targets, they increasingly come to believe the announced target path. We shall refer to this case
as concave (expectations) updating.
4This reects a population, although happy to accept that the monetary authority dislikes
the current relatively high rate of ination, nevertheless worries that as the slope of the short-run
Phillips curve attens the monetary authority may be tempted to renege. The importance of
the exploitability of the Phillips curve has been emphasized by Ball, Mankiw and Romer (1988)
and is a crucial factor in high ination equilibria in games of the Barro and Gordon (1983) sort.
We refer to this as convex (expectations) updating.
5If t takes a longer time to reach zero, output obviously also takes a longer time to reach
its new steady state level.
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of di¤erent values in order to explore the e¤ect of time varying velocity on output
(Irelands case ( = 0 and  = 0) is a special case of the work carried out here).
Parameter Value Description
 0:1 intertemporal elasticity of substitution
(value as in Ball, Mankiw and Romer, 1988)
b 6 price elasticity of demand
(value as in Rotemberg and Woodford, 1992)
k 0:1075 cost of price adjustment (value as in Ireland, 1997)
 0:97 discount factor; each interval of time
corresponds to 6 months
(value as in Ball and Mankiw, 1994)
 1 degree of disutility from work
(value as in Nicolae and Nolan, 2006)
Parameters capturing the degree of time varying velocity
 [0; 1) (1  ) is the scale elasticity of money demand
 [0; 1) opportunity cost semi-elasticity of money demand
Table 1. Parameter values used in the model calibration.
In the following section, we present benchmark results from the existing
literature. These describe the behaviour of output during immediate and gradual
disinations starting from low initial ination rates, where velocity is assumed
constant and there is perfect credibility. The subsequent section analyses the
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output response to gradual disination in the full model when velocity is allowed
to vary.and there is imperfect credibility.
3. Benchmark Results
This section presents results familiar from the literature for the specic case where
velocity is assumed constant and there is perfect credibility (Ireland, 1997). Figure
3.1 shows two key results: (i) that immediate (T = 1) disination from a low
(3%) ination rate brings about a signicant early output loss (some 1.47% in
the rst period and 1.67% in the second period) before reaching its new steady-
state level; and (ii) that gradual (T = 6) disination from a low (3%) initial
ination rate brings about a much smaller early fall in output (now 0.2% in the
rst period) which is then followed by a substantive (compensatory) output boom
before the new steady-state is reached6: Irelands policy conclusion that small
inations should be disinated gradually is clearly evident.
4. Output E¤ects of Immediate and Gradual Disination
with Time Varying Velocity and Imperfect Credibility
Evans and Nicolae 2009 have shown that when time varying velocity is endogenized
in Irelands model, the early output loss will be larger and the output boom may
disappear raising questions about the net impact on output over time. In the
next section we explore this question more fully, but rst we present some output
paths for a specic gradual disination from a low initial ination rate for 3 cases:
i)  = 0;  = 0; 0 = 0 (Irelands model); ii)  = 0:01;  = 0:05; 0 = 0 (model
allowing for time varying velocity); and iii)  = 0:01;  = 0:05; 0 = 1 (allowing
6Such disinationary booms are typically understood as follows. Under perfect credibility,
agents respond in advance of the change in policy by lowering their prices, knowing that ination
is going to be lower in the future. Because agents set prices for two periods, and because ination
will be lower in the future, they set lower prices today, inducing a boom (Ball 1994).
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Figure 3.1: Benchmark Result (Ireland, 1997): Output e¤ect of an immediate
and gradual disination of a small (3%) initial annual ination rate ( = 0;
 = 0; 0 = 0).
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
   delta=0; rho=0; sigma0=0
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   delta=0.01; rho=0.05; sigma0=1
Figure 4.1: Imperfect Credibility Result: Output e¤ect of a gradual (T = 6 )
disination from a small(3%) initial annual ination rate.
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for time varying velocity and imperfect credibility). Our emphasis is on gradual
disination from low initial ination rates.
Figure 4.1 shows the output e¤ect of a gradual (T = 6) disination from
a low (3%) initial annual ination rate when we have perfect credibility and
constant velocity and with time varying velocity with both perfect (0 = 0) and
imperfect credibility (0 = 1). Di¤erent values for the parameters  and  capture
di¤erent degrees of time varying velocity, but here they have been set to reect
empirical estimates of the relevant opportunity cost and income elasticities of
the demand for money;  = 0:05 (as in Ball 2001) while  takes the minimum
value for the range of values [0:01; 0:03] reported in a survey of recent empirical
money demand studies (Sriram 2001). The minimum value has been chosen here
because the early output loss is an increasing function of  and the arguments
we are about to develop become even stronger for higher values of : Figure 4.1
shows that relative to Irelands early output loss and compensating boom, the
impact of having endogenized time varying velocity is to induce much larger early
output losses and a much moderated boom. The impact of having also allowed
for imperfect credibility is to further deepen the early output loss and leave no
hint of an output boom. It is clear from the output path from the full model that
the disination i) involves sacricing output for a considerable time - in excess of
3 years; and ii) brings about a higher steady state value of output which could
only compensate for the early output loss after a substantial period of time has
elapsed. Indeed, as can be seen from Figure 4.2, in which we superimpose the
output path resulting from an immediate disination in Irelands model our full
model yields early output losses broadly similar to the impact of an immediate
disination in Irelands original model. Of course, in Irelands case these large
losses could be avoided by opting for a gradual disination. However, there is
no similar option here - thereby raising a key question about whether gradual
16
disination is benecial.
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
   delta=0; rho=0; sigma0=0; T=1
   delta=0; rho=0; sigma0=0; T=6
   delta=0.01; rho=0.05; sigma0=0 T=6
   delta=0.01; rho=0.05; sigma0=1; T=6
Figure 4.2: Imperfect Credibility - Comparison Result: Output e¤ect of
a gradual disination from a small(3%) initial annual ination rate compared
with that of immediate disination of Irelands benchmark model .
To explore this issue further, we construct a crude measure of the overall
impact on output by projecting forward over a 30 year time horizon and calculating
the net output gain. Tables 2 and 3 sets out the value of the area between the
output pathand the x axis for a range of  values for two cases of perfect and
imperfect credibility respectively7. The area below the axis gives the output loss,
and that above the axis gives the output gain. The absolute size of the overall
impact is noted in the nal column and dened to be the net output gain. We can
7 has been allowed to vary but  = 0 is maintained. For values of  2 (0; 1) the calculated
output loss is yet higher.
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see that for su¢ ciently high values of  the overall impact on output is negative.
(If we were to calculate present values, overall net losses would arise at even lower
levels of ). Also, we can see that imperfect credibility serves to ;lower the value
of  at which the overall impact on putput is negative.
 Loss Gain Net Output Gain
0 (0.42) 4.97 4.55
0.001 (0.65) 4.82 4.17
0.005 (1.72) 4.38 2.66
0.01 (3.22) 4.00 0.77
0.02 (6.60) 3.61 -2.99
0.03 (10.22) 3.49 -6.73
0.05 (17.56) 3.40 -14.15
Table 2. Overall impact on real output of a gradual disination from a 3%
initial annual ination rate under perfect credibility for di¤erent values of the
velocity parameter  (with  = 0; 0 = 0).
 Loss Gain Net Output Gain
0 (0.98) 3.63 2.64
0.001 (1.33) 3.60 2.26
0.005 (2.76) 3.54 0.77
0.01 (4.58) 3.49 -1.08
0.02 (8.23) 3.44 -4.79
0.03 (11.89) 3.41 -8.48
0.05 (19.17) 3.36 -15.81
Table 3. Overall impact on real output of a gradual disination from a 3%
initial annual ination rate under imperfect credibility for di¤erent values of the
velocity parameter  (with  = 0, 0 = 1).
In the light of these results, Irelands (1997) conclusion that small inations
are best ended gradually may need to be qualied: it seems that even disinating
a low ination gradually may be undesirable since the net overall impacton the
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real economy may be negative. This shift in the potential policy conclusion is
attributable to the introduction of time varying velocity and imperfect credibility
The intuition of the impact of having endogenized time varying velocity is
that a disination reduces both ination and consumption in the short run and
it is also associated with a decline in velocity (from (5)). However, this decline
in velocity means equivalently, that for given levels of prices and consumption,
nominal money demand would have to rise. This increase in money demand
exacerbates the excess demand created by the disinationary reduction in the
money supply. Since prices are slow to adjust, the recessionary output e¤ect is
magnied, making time varying velocity costly on output.
With imperfect credibility, agents only gradually come to realize that the price-
level is to grow at a zero rate a realization that is all the more tardy because
of the gradualness of the disinationary process itself. This tardiness results in
more of the necessary adjustment being borne by output losses than prices. Under
imperfect credibility, the initial contraction in output is more severe for any initial
ination rate than under perfect credibility.
The analysis in this section raises important question for policymakers faced
with low ination. When considering the choice between disinating gradually
and immediately, Ireland advocated a preference for gradual disination since
immediate disination generates unambiguously bigger output losses under the
assumptions of perfect credibility and constant velocity. Using the full model
developed here (which relaxes both of these strong assumption simultaneously)
we have found that, of itself, this scale of bigger will ensues from gradual
disination. This shifts our focus to the policy question of alternative rates of
gradual disinations. Put more succinctly, we turn to the question of an optimal
speed of disination.
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5. Optimal Speed of Disination
As (Ireland 1997) recognises, the optimal speed of disination is important
information for policymakers who must decide on the time horizon over which
they bring about price stability. In this paper we calculate the optimal speed of
disination in our time varying velocity model8. To do this, we use our extended
non-linear solution method to calculate the level of utility associated with di¤erent
speeds of disination for a range of initial ination rates from 1% to 25%. The
optimal speed of disination is given by the length of time for which utility is
maximized9.11
As we have seen so far, a gradual disination in a model with price stickiness
and constant velocity results in output rising above the new steady-state for some
time after the initial fall10.12 However, from higher initial ination rates, the
contraction in output in the early periods of the disination is more pronounced,
increasingly o¤setting the utility gain from any subsequent boom pushing the
optimal speed of disination up. Since the time varying velocity e¤ect on output
makes the initial contraction yet more severe and makes the disinationary boom
almost disappear, utility is much lower than in the case where velocity is constant
( = 0,  = 0). Since more gradual disination boosts utility, the time needed
for the disination would need to be longer (i.e. the optimal speed of disination
slower).
Indeed, it turns out that a more gradual period of disination is optimal for the
case in which  > 0 and/or  > 0: This can be seen in Figure 5.1 where we illustrate
8At this stage, we limit our attention to the case of perfect credibility, 0 = 0: Work is
currently in progress on the case of imperfect credbility, 0 = 1:
9The calculation was conducted for lengths of the disination period ranging from immediate
T = 1 to more gradual T = 45; where T is the length of the period of disination measured in
half yearly intervals.
10To calculate the optimal speed of disination, we maximize utility which derives from labour
as well as consumption. In this framework, consumption follows the same path as output.
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Figure 5.1: Optimal Speed of Disination: For any given values of  and ,
higher initial ination rates need to be deated over shorter time horizons. Higher
values of  and/or  shift the relationship such that deation periods need to be
longer, (0 = 0).
the cases in which  = 0:05,  = 0 and  = 0,  = 0:02 alongside the benchmark
case( = 0,  = 0). Across the range of initial ination rates, the optimal speed
of disination is decreased. For example, for an initial ination rate of around
10%, approximately a year longer is required for the disinationary time period
when  = 0:05,  = 0, and approximately 6 years is required for the deationary
time period when  = 0,  = 0:02: For initial ination rates greater than the
upper teens, the disinationary period would need to be approximately 6 months
longer when  = 0:05,  = 0 and approximately 18 months longer when  = 0,
 = 0:02: It is evident that allowing for time varying velocity through  (the scale
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elasticity of money demand parameter) a¤ects the optimal speed of disination
by less than allowing for time varying velocity through  (the opportunity cost
parameter). This is because, as ination is brought down, the demand for money
rises, moderating the downward pressure on money demand from the induced
output change.
When velocity is time varying, utility maximizing policymakers cannot
necessarily rely on a disinationary boom to compensate the (greater) early losses
in output. To avoid the early extra cost imposed by time varying velocity, a more
gradual disination makes the contractions in activity in the early period of the
disination less sharp.
6. Discussion and Conclusions
This paper examines the case for making the transition from low inations to
price stability. In crude terms, if the benets of price stability exceed the cost of
transition, disinationary policy actions may be justied. The analysis is carried
out with a DSGE model with sticky prices, time varying velocity and imperfect
credibility. The nonlinear solution method reveals that early output losses may be
more pronounced and more prolonged than previously suggested in the literature
and there may be insu¢ cient compensation from a subsequent higher steady state
to justify taking any disinationary policy action in some cases.
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